Loading (50 kb)...'

National
United States Regulations
15 CFR PART 742—CONTROL POLICY—CCL BASED CONTROLS


Title 15: Commerce and Foreign Trade





PART 742—CONTROL POLICY—CCL BASED CONTROLS




--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 et seq.; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.; 42 U.S.C. 2139a; Sec. 901–911, Pub. L. 106–387; Sec. 221, Pub. L. 107–56; Sec 1503, Pub. L. 108–11,117 Stat. 559; E.O. 12058, 43 FR 20947, 3 CFR, 1978 Comp., p. 179; E.O. 12851, 58 FR 33181, 3 CFR, 1993 Comp., p. 608; E.O. 12938, 59 FR 59099, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 950; E.O. 13026, 61 FR 58767, 3 CFR, 1996 Comp., p. 228; E.O. 13222, 66 FR 44025, 3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p. 783; Presidential Determination 2003–23 of May 7, 2003, 68 FR 26459, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 320; Notice of November 4, 2004, 69 FR 64637, 3 CFR, 2004 Comp., p. 303; Notice of August 2, 2005, 70 FR 45273 (August 5, 2005).

Source: 61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, unless otherwise noted.

§ 742.1 Introduction.
top
In this part, references to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are references to 15 CFR chapter VII, subchapter C.

(a) Scope. This part describes all the reasons for control reflected in the Country Chart in Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR. In addition, it includes licensing requirements and licensing policies for the following items that are not reflected on the Country Chart: specially designed implements of torture, high performance computers, and communications intercepting devices. In addition to describing the reasons for control and licensing requirements and policies, this part describes any applicable contract sanctity provisions that may apply to specific controls and includes a description of any multilateral regime under which specific controls are maintained.

(b) Reasons for control listed on the CCL not covered by this part. This part describes the license requirements and the licensing policies for all the “Reasons for Control” that are listed on the Commerce Control List (CCL) except “Short Supply” and “U.N. Sanctions,” which do not appear on the Country Chart.

(1) Short Supply. ECCNs containing items subject to short supply controls (“SS”) refer the exporter to part 754 of the EAR. These ECCNs are: 0A980 (Horses for export by sea); 1C980 (certain inorganic chemicals); 1C981 (Crude petroleum, including reconstituted crude petroleum, tar sands, and crude shale oil); 1C982 (certain other petroleum products); 1C983 (Natural gas liquids and other natural gas derivatives); 1C984 (certain manufactured gas and synthetic natural gas (except when commingled with natural gas and thus subject to export authorization from the Department of Energy); and 1C988 (Western red cedar (thuja plicata) logs and timber, and rough, dressed and worked lumber containing wane).

(2) U.N. Sanctions. The United Nations imposes sanctions, short of complete embargoes, against certain countries which may result in controls that supplement those otherwise maintained under the EAR for that particular country. This part does not address license requirements and licensing policies for controls implementing U.N. sanctions. CCL entries containing items subject to U.N. sanctions will refer the exporter to part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls, for any supplemental controls that may apply to exports and reexports involving these countries.

(c) Exports and reexports involving Cuba and Iran. This part does not cover license requirements and licensing policies that apply to exports and reexports to embargoed destinations (Cuba and Iran). These comprehensive embargoes cover a broader range of items than those reflected in the CCL. If you are exporting or reexporting to any of these destinations, you should first review part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls.

(d) Anti-terrorism Controls on Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Commerce maintains anti-terrorism controls on Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan under section 6(a) of the Export Administration Act. Items controlled under section 6(a) to Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea and Libya are described in §§742.8, 742.9, 742.10, 742.19, and 742.20, respectively, and in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Items controlled under section 6(a) to Iraq are described in §746.3(a)(3). Commerce also maintains controls under section 6(j) of the EAA to Cuba, Libya, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Items controlled to these countries under EAA section 6(j) are also described in Supplement 2 to part 742. The Secretaries of Commerce and State are required to notify appropriate Committees of the Congress 30 days before issuing a license for an item controlled under section 6(j) to Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, Sudan or Syria. As noted in paragraph (c) of this section, if you are exporting or reexporting to Cuba, Iran, or Iraq you should review part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls.

(e) End-user and end-use based controls. This part does not cover prohibitions and licensing requirements for exports of items not included on the CCL that are subject to end-use and end-user controls: certain nuclear end-uses; certain missile end-uses; certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses; certain naval nuclear propulsion end-uses; certain activities of U.S. persons; and certain exports to and for the use of certain foreign vessels and aircraft. Licensing requirements and policies for these exports are contained in part 744 of the EAR.

(f) Overlapping license policies. Many items on the CCL are subject to more than one type of control (e.g., national security (NS), missile technology (MT), nuclear nonproliferation (NP), regional stability (RS)). In addition, applications for all items on the CCL, other than those controlled for short supply reasons, may be reviewed for missile technology (see §742.5(b)(3) of this part), nuclear nonproliferation (see §742.3(b)(2) of this part), or chemical and biological weapons (see §742.2(b)(3) of this part), if the end-use or end-user may be involved in certain proliferation activities. Finally, many multilaterally controlled items are reviewed for anti-terrorism reasons if they are destined for a terrorism-supporting country (see paragraph (d) of this section). Your application for a license will be reviewed under all applicable licensing policies. A license will be issued only if an application can be approved under all applicable licensing policies.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 62 FR 25458, May 9, 1997; 65 FR 38151, June 19, 2000; 69 FR 23629, Apr. 29, 2004; 69 FR 46075, July 30, 2004]

§ 742.2 Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.
top
(a) License requirements. The following controls are maintained in support of the U.S. foreign policy of opposing the proliferation and illegal use of chemical and biological weapons. (See also §742.18 of this part for license requirements pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention).

(1) If CB Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to all destinations, including Canada, for the following:

(i) Human pathogens, zoonoses, toxins, animal pathogens, genetically modified microorganisms and plant pathogens identified in ECCNs 1C351, 1C352, 1C353 and 1C354; and

(ii) Technology (ECCNs 1E001 and 1E351) for the production and/or disposal of microbiological commodities described in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section.

(2) If CB Column 2 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to all destinations except countries in Country Group A:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) (Australia Group members) for the following:

(i) Chemicals identified in ECCN 1C350 (precursor and intermediate chemicals used in the production of chemical warfare agents).

(A) This license requirement includes chemical mixtures identified in ECCN 1C350.b, .c, or .d, except as specified in License Requirements Note 2 to that ECCN.

(B) This licensing requirement does not include chemical compounds created with any chemicals identified in ECCN 1C350, unless those compounds are also identified in ECCN 1C350.

(C) This licensing requirement does not apply to any of the following medical, analytical, diagnostic, and food testing kits that consist of pre-packaged materials of defined composition that are specifically developed, packaged, and marketed for diagnostic, analytical, or public health purposes:

(1) Test kits containing no more than 300 grams of any chemical controlled by ECCN 1C350.b or .c (CB-controlled chemicals also identified as Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals under the CWC) that are destined for export or reexport to CWC States Parties (destinations listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR). Such test kits are controlled by ECCN 1C395 for CB and CW reasons, to States not Party to the CWC (destinations not listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 745 of the EAR), and for AT reasons.

(2) Test kits that contain no more than 300 grams of any chemical controlled by ECCN 1C350.d (CB-controlled chemicals not also identified as Schedule 1, 2, or 3 chemicals under the CWC). Such test kits are controlled by ECCN 1C995 for AT reasons.

(ii) Software (ECCN 1D390) for process control that is specifically configured to control or initiate production of the chemical precursors controlled by ECCN 1C350.

(iii) Technology (ECCN 1E001) for the development or production of chemical detection systems and dedicated detectors therefore, controlled by ECCN 1A004.c, that also have the technical characteristics described in ECCN 2B351.a.

(iv) Technology (ECCNs 1E001 and 1E350) involving the following for facilities designed or intended to produce chemicals described in 1C350:

(A) Overall plant design;

(B) Design, specification, or procurement of equipment;

(C) Supervision of construction, installation, or operation of complete plant or components thereof;

(D) Training of personnel; or

(E) Consultation on specific problems involving such facilities.

(v) Technology (ECCNs 1E001 and 1E351) for the production and/or disposal of chemical precursors described in ECCN 1C350;

(vi) Equipment and materials identified in ECCN 2B350 or 2B351 on the CCL, chemical detection systems controlled by 1A004.c for detecting chemical warfare agents and having the characteristics of toxic gas monitoring systems described in 2B351.a, and valves controlled by ECCN 2A226 or ECCN 2A292 having the characteristics of those described in 2B350.g, which can be used in the production of chemical weapons precursors or chemical warfare agents.

(vii) Equipment and materials identified in ECCN 2B352, which can be used in the production of biological agents.

(viii) Technology identified in ECCN 2E001, 2E002, or 2E301 for:

(A) The development, production, or use of items controlled by ECCN 2B350, 2B351, or 2B352; or

(B) The development or production of valves controlled by ECCN 2A226 or 2A292 having the characteristics of those described in ECCN 2B350.g.

(ix) Technology identified in ECCN 2E201 or 2E290 for the use of valves controlled by ECCN 2A226 or 2A292 having the characteristics of those described in 2B350.g.

(3) If CB Column 3 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to Country Group D:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) for medical products identified in ECCN 1C991.d.

(4) A license is required, to States not Party to the CWC (destinations not listed in Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 of the EAR), for mixtures controlled by 1C395.a and test kits controlled by 1C395.b.

(b) Licensing policy. (1) License applications for the items described in paragraph (a) of this section will be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport would make a material contribution to the design, development, production, stockpiling or use of chemical or biological weapons. When an export or reexport is deemed to make such a material contribution, the license will be denied. When an export or reexport is intended to be used in a chemical weapons or biological weapons program, or for chemical or biological weapons terrorism purposes, it is deemed to make a material contribution. The factors listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section are among those that will be considered to determine what action should be taken on license applications for these items.

(2) The following factors are among those that will be considered to determine what action should be taken on license applications for the items described in paragraph (a) of this section:

(i) The specific nature of the end-use, including the appropriateness of the stated end-use;

(ii) The significance of the export and reexport in terms of its potential contribution to the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons;

(iii) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country, including the importing country's chemical and biological capabilities and objectives;

(iv) The extent and effectiveness of the export control system in the importing country and in any intermediary country through which the items being exported or reexported will transit or be transshipped en route to the importing country;

(v) The risk that the items will be diverted for use in a chemical weapons or biological weapons program, or for chemical weapons or biological weapons terrorism purposes;

(vi) The reliability of the parties to the transaction, including whether:

(A) An export or reexport license application involving any such parties has previously been denied;

(B) Any such parties have been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement activities;

(C) The end-user is capable of securely handling and storing the items to be exported or reexported;

(vii) Relevant information about proliferation and terrorism activities, including activities involving the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons by any parties to the transaction;

(viii) The types of assurances or guarantees against the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons that are given in a particular case, including any relevant assurances provided by the importing country or the end-user;

(ix) The applicability of other multilateral export control or nonproliferation agreements (e.g., the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) to the transaction; and

(x) The existence of a pre-existing contract.

(3) BIS will review license applications in accordance with the licensing policy described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section for items not described in paragraph (a) of this section that:

(i) Require a license for reasons other than short supply; and

(ii) Could be destined for the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons, or for a facility engaged in such activities.

(c) Contract sanctity. Contract sanctity dates are set forth in Supplement No. 1 to part 742. Applicants who wish that a preexisting contract be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit documentation sufficient to establish the existence of such a contract.

(d) Australia Group. The Australia Group, a multilateral body that works to halt the spread of chemical and biological weapons, has developed common control lists of items specifically related to chemical and biological weapons. Australia Group members are listed in Country Group A:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). Controls on items listed in paragraph (a) of this section are consistent with lists agreed to in the Australia Group.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 62 FR 25458, May 9, 1997; 63 FR 42228, Aug. 7, 1998; 64 FR 27142, May 18, 1999; 64 FR 28909, May 28, 1999; 66 FR 49524, Sept. 28, 2001; 67 FR 37982, May 31, 2002; 67 FR 55598, Aug. 29, 2002; 68 FR 34529, June 10, 2003; 68 FR 67031, Dec. 1, 2003; 69 FR 42865, July 19, 2004; 69 FR 77893, Dec. 29, 2004; 70 FR 2349, Jan. 13, 2005; 70 FR 19690, Apr. 14, 2005]

§ 742.3 Nuclear nonproliferation.
top
(a) License requirements. Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 requires BIS to identify items subject to the EAR that could be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes if used for activities other than those authorized at the time of export or reexport. ECCNs on the CCL that include the symbol “NP 1” or “NP 2” in the “Country Chart” column of the “License Requirements” section identify items that could be of significance for nuclear explosive purposes and are therefore subject to licensing requirements under this part and under section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. These items are referred to as “The Nuclear Referral List” and are subject to the following licensing requirements:

(1) If NP Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required to all destinations except Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member countries (Country Group A:4) (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

(2) If NP Column 2 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the applicable ECCN, a license is required to Country Group D:2 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) except India.

(3) Other nuclear-related license requirements are described in §§744.2 and 744.5 of the EAR.

(b) Licensing policy. (1) To implement the controls in paragraph (a) of this section, the following factors are among those used to determine what action should be taken on individual applications:

(i) Whether the items to be transferred are appropriate for the stated end-use and whether that stated end-use is appropriate for the end-user;

(ii) The significance for nuclear purposes of the particular item;

(iii) Whether the items to be exported or reexported are to be used in research on, or for the development, design, manufacture, construction, operation, or maintenance of, any reprocessing or enrichment facility;

(iv) The types of assurances or guarantees given against use for nuclear explosive purposes or proliferation in the particular case;

(v) Whether any party to the transaction has been engaged in clandestine or illegal procurement activities;

(vi) Whether an application for a license to export or reexport to the end-user has previously been denied, or whether the end-user has previously diverted items received under a general license, a License Exception, or a validated license to unauthorized activities;

(vii) Whether the export or reexport would present an unacceptable risk of diversion to a nuclear explosive activity or unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity described in §744.2(a) of the EAR; and

(viii) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country, based on consideration of the following factors:

(A) Whether the importing country is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) or to a similar international legally-binding nuclear nonproliferation agreement;

(B) Whether the importing country has all of its nuclear activities, facilities, or installations that are operational, being designed, or under construction under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or equivalent full scope safeguards;

(C) Whether there is an agreement for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy between the U.S. and the importing country;

(D) Whether the actions, statements, and policies of the government of the importing country are in support of nuclear nonproliferation and whether that government is in compliance with its international obligations in the field of non-proliferation;

(E) The degree to which the government of the importing country cooperates in non-proliferation policy generally (e.g., willingness to consult on international nonproliferation issues); and

(F) Information on the importing country's nuclear intentions and activities.

(2) In addition, BIS will review license applications in accordance with the licensing policy described in paragraph (b) of this section for items not on the Nuclear Referral List that:

(i) Require a license on the CCL for reasons other than “short supply;” and

(ii) Are intended for a nuclear related end-use or end-user.

(3) For the People's Republic of China, the general licensing policy for applications for those items that would make a direct and significant contribution to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems is extended review or denial.

(c) Contract sanctity. Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

(d) Nuclear Suppliers Group. Most items on the Nuclear Referral List that require a license under NP Column No. 1 on the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) are contained in the Annex to the “Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology” (the Annex), as published by the International Atomic Energy Agency in INFCIRC/254/Revision 1/Part 2. The adherents to INFCIRC/254/Revision 1/Part 2, which includes the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, have agreed to establish export licensing procedures for the transfer of items identified in the Annex. Items that are listed as requiring a license under NP Column No. 2 on the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) are not included in the Annex and are controlled only by the United States.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 70 FR 51252, Aug. 30, 2005]

§ 742.4 National security.
top
(a) License requirements. It is the policy of the United States to restrict the export and reexport of items that would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. Accordingly, a license is required for exports and reexports to all destinations, except Canada, for all items in ECCNs on the CCL that include NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section. A license is required to all destinations except Country Group A:1 and cooperating countries (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740), Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia for all items in ECCNs on the CCL that include NS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section. The purpose of the controls is to ensure that these items do not make a contribution to the military potential of countries in Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. License Exception GBS is available for the export and reexport of certain national security controlled items to Country Group B (see §740.4 and Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

(b) Licensing policy. (1) The policy for national security controlled items exported or reexported to any country except a country in Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications unless there is a significant risk that the items will be diverted to a country in Country Group D:1.

(2) Except for those countries described in paragraphs (b)(5) through (b)(7) of this section, the general policy for exports and reexports of items to Country Group D:1 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) is to approve applications when BIS determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the items are for civilian use or would otherwise not make a significant contribution to the military potential of the country of destination that would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States.

(3) To permit such policy judgments to be made, each application is reviewed in the light of prevailing policies with full consideration of all aspects of the proposed transaction. The review generally includes:

(i) An analysis of the kinds and quantities of items to be shipped;

(ii) Their military or civilian uses;

(iii) The unrestricted availability abroad of the same or comparable items;

(iv) The country of destination;

(v) The ultimate end-users in the country of destination; and

(vi) The intended end-use.

(4) Although each proposed transaction is considered individually, items described in Advisory Notes on the Commerce Control List are more likely to be approved than others.

(5) In recognition of efforts made to adopt safeguard measures for exports and reexports, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Russia are accorded enhanced favorable consideration licensing treatment.

(6) The general policy for Cambodia and Laos is to approve license applications when BIS determines, on a case-by-case basis, that the items are for an authorized use in Cambodia or Laos and are not likely to be diverted to another country or use contrary to the national security or foreign policy controls of the United States.

(7) For the People's Republic of China, the general licensing policy is to approve applications, except that those items that would make a direct and significant contribution to electronic and anti-submarine warfare, intelligence gathering, power projection, and air superiority receive extended review or denial. Each application will be considered individually. Items may be approved even though they may contribute to Chinese military development or the end-user or end-use is military. Note that the Advisory Notes in the CCL headed “Note for the People's Republic of China” provide guidance on equipment likely to be approved more rapidly for China.

(c) Contract sanctity. Contract sanctity provisions are not available for license applications reviewed under this section.

(d) [Reserved]

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 61 FR 64283, Dec. 4, 1996; 70 FR 67348, Nov. 7, 2005]

§ 742.5 Missile technology.
top
(a) License requirements. (1) In support of U.S. foreign policy to limit the proliferation of missiles, a license is required to export and reexport items related to the design, development, production, or use of missiles. These items are identified in ECCNs on the CCL as MT Column No. 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section. Licenses for these items are required to all destinations, except Canada, as indicated by MT Column 1 of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).

(2) The term “missiles” is defined as rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms (kg) payload to a range of a least 300 kilometers (km). See §746.3 of the EAR for definition of a “ballistic missile” to be exported or reexported to Iraq.

(b) Licensing policy. (1) Applications to export and reexport items identified in ECCNs on the CCL as MT Column No. 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section will be considered on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport would make a material contribution to the proliferation of missiles. Applications for exports and reexports of such items contained in Category 7A or described by ECCN 9A101 on the CCL will be considered more favorably if such exports or reexports are determined to be destined to a manned aircraft, satellite, land vehicle, or marine vessel, in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for such applications. When an export or reexport is deemed to make a material contribution to the proliferation of missiles, the license will be denied.

(2) The following factors are among those that will be considered in reviewing individual applications.

(i) The specific nature of the end-use;

(ii) The significance of the export and reexport in terms of its contribution to the design, development, production, or use of missiles;

(iii) The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient country;

(iv) The nonproliferation credentials of the importing country;

(v) The types of assurances or guarantees against design, development, production, or use of missiles that are given in a particular case; and

(vi) The existence of a preexisting contract.

(3) Controls on other items. BIS will review license applications, in accordance with the licensing policy described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, for items not described in paragraph (a) of this section that:

(i) Require a validated license for reasons other than short supply; and

(ii) Could be destined for the design, development, production, or use of missiles, or for a facility engaged in such activities.

(c) Contract sanctity. The following contract sanctity dates have been established:

(1) License applications for batch mixers specified in ECCN 1B117 involving contracts that were entered into prior to January 19, 1990, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(2) License applications subject to ECCN 1B115.b or .c that involve a contract entered into prior to March 7, 1991, will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(3) Applicants who wish that a pre-existing contract be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit documentation sufficient to establish the existence of a contract.

(d) Missile Technology Control Regime. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) members are listed in Country Group A:2 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). Controls on items identified in paragraph (a) of this section are consistent with the list agreed to in the MTCR and included in the MTCR Annex.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 68 FR 16147, Apr. 2, 2003; 69 FR 46075, July 30, 2004]

§ 742.6 Regional stability.
top
(a) License requirements. The following controls are maintained in support of U.S. foreign policy to maintain regional stability:

(1) As indicated in the CCL and in RS Column 1 of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR), a license is required to all destinations, except Canada, for items described on the CCL under ECCNs 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, .c, or .e; 6A003.b.3 and b.4; 6A008.j.1; 6A998.b; 6D001 (only “software” for the “development” or “production” of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, .c; 6A003.b.3 and .b.4; or 6A008.j.1); 6D002 (only “software” for the “use” of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, .c; 6A003.b.3 and .b.4; or 6A008.j.1); 6D991 (only “software” for the “development,” “production,” or “use” of equipment controlled by 6A002.e or 6A998.b); 6E001 (only “technology” for “development” of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, and .c or .e, 6A003.b.3 and b.4, or 6A008.j.1); 6E002 (only “technology” for “production” of items in 6A002.a.1, a.2, a.3, .c, or .e, 6A003.b.3 or b.4, or 6A008.j.1); 6E991 (only “technology” for the “development,” ldquo;production,” or “use” of equipment controlled by 6A998.b); 7D001 (only “software” for “development” or “production” of items in 7A001, 7A002, or 7A003); 7E001 (only “technology” for the “development” of inertial navigation systems, inertial equipment, and specially designed components therefor for civil aircraft); 7E002 (only “technology” for the “production” of inertial navigation systems, inertial equipment, and specially designed components therefor for civil aircraft); 7E101 (only “technology” for the “use” of inertial navigation systems, inertial equipment, and specially designed components for civil aircraft).

(2) As indicated in the CCL and in RS Column 2 of the Country Chart (see Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR), a license is required to any destination except Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for items described on the CCL under ECCNs 0A918, 0E918, 2A983, 2D983, 2E983, 8A918, and for military vehicles and certain commodities (specially designed) used to manufacture military equipment, described on the CCL in ECCNs 0A018.c, 1B018.a, 2B018, and 9A018.a and .b.

(b) Licensing policy. (1) Applications to export and reexport items described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the export or reexport could contribute directly or indirectly to any country's military capabilities in a manner that would alter or destabilize a region's military balance contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.

(2) Applications to export and reexport commodities described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section will generally be considered favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is evidence that the export or reexport would contribute significantly to the destabilization of the region to which the equipment is destined.

(3) For terrorist-designated countries, the applicable licensing policies are found in parts 742 and 746 of the EAR.

(c) Contract sanctity date: March 21, 2003. This contract sanctity date applies only to items controlled under ECCNs 2A983, 2D983 and 2E983 destined for countries not listed in Country Group E (Supplement 1 to part 740). See parts 742 and 746 for the contract sanctity requirements applicable to exports and reexports to countries listed in Country Group E.

(d) U.S. controls. Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining regional stability controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 63 FR 2458, Jan. 15, 1998; 67 FR 11897, Mar. 18, 2002; 67 FR 59725, Sept. 23, 2002; 68 FR 16211, Apr. 3, 2003; 69 FR 16480, Mar. 30, 2004; 69 FR 36010, June 28, 2004]

§ 742.7 Crime control.
top
(a) License requirements. In support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world, a license is required to export and reexport crime control and detection equipment, related technology and software as follows:

(1) Crime control and detection instruments and equipment and related technology and software identified in the appropriate ECCNs on the CCL under CC Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section. A license is required to countries listed in CC Column 1 (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR). Items affected by this requirement are identified on the CCL under the following ECCNs: 0A978, 0A979, 0A984, 0A987, 0E984, 1A984, 1A985, 3A980, 3A981, 3D980, 3E980, 4A003 (for fingerprint computers only), 4A980, 4D001 (for fingerprint computers only), 4D980, 4E001 (for fingerprint computers only), 4E980, 6A002 (for police-model infrared viewers only), 6E001 (for police-model infrared viewers only), 6E002 (for police-model infrared viewers only), and 9A980.

(2) Shotguns with a barrel length greater than or equal to 24 inches, identified in ECCN 0A984 on the CCL under CC Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section regardless of end-user to countries listed in CC Column 2 (Supplement No. 1 part 738 of the EAR).

(3) Shotguns with barrel length greater than or equal to 24 inches, identified in ECCN 0A984 on the CCL under CC Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section only if for sale or resale to police or law enforcement entities in countries listed in CC Column 3 (Supplement No. 1 part 738 of the EAR).

(4) Certain crime control items require a license to all destinations, except Canada. These items are identified under ECCNs 0A982, 0A985, and 0E982. Controls for these items appear in each ECCN; a column specific to these controls does not appear in the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).

(5) See §742.11 of the EAR for further information on items controlled under ECCN 0A983, which require a license to all destinations, including Canada.

(b) Licensing policy. Applications for items controlled under this section will generally be considered favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is civil disorder in the country or region or unless there is evidence that the government of the importing country may have violated internationally recognized human rights. The judicious use of export controls is intended to deter the development of a consistent pattern of human rights abuses, distance the United States from such abuses and avoid contributing to civil disorder in a country or region.

(c) Contract sanctity. Contract sanctity date: August 22, 2000. Contract sanctity applies only to items controlled under ECCNs 0A982, 0A985 and 0E982 destined for countries not listed in CC Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR).

(d) U.S. controls. Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining controls on crime control and detection items, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

[65 FR 55178, Sept. 13, 2000]

§ 742.8 Anti-terrorism: Iran.
top
(a) License requirements. (1) If AT column 1 or AT column 2 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to Part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for export to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes. In addition, portable electric power generators and related software and technology (ECCNs 2A994, 2D994 and 2E994) are controlled for export to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes. See paragraph (a)(5) of this section for controls maintained by the Department of the Treasury.

(2) If AT column 1 or AT column 2 of the Commerce Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for reexport to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes, except for ECCNs 2A994; 3A992.a; 5A991.g; 5A992; 6A991; 6A998; 7A994; 8A992.d, .e, .f, and .g; 9A990.a and .b; and 9A991.d and .e. In addition, items in these ECCNs are not counted as controlled U.S. content for the purpose of determining license requirements for U.S. parts, components or materials incorporated into foreign made products. However, the export from the United States to any destination with knowledge that they will be reexported directly or indirectly, in whole or in part to Iran is prohibited without a license. See paragraph (a)(5) of this section for controls maintained by the Department of the Treasury.

(3) The Secretary of State has designated Iran as a country whose Government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(4) In support of U.S. foreign policy on terrorism-supporting countries, BIS maintains two types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport of items described in Supplement 2 to part 742.

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA), if destined to military, police, intelligence or other sensitive end-users.

(ii) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to non-sensitive end-users, as well as items described in paragraphs (c)(6) through (c)(44) to all end-users, are controlled to Iran under section 6(a) of the EAA. (See Supplement No. 2 to part 742 for more information on items controlled under sections 6(a) and 6(j) of the EAA and §750.6 of the EAR for procedures for processing license applications for items controlled under EAA section 6(j).)

(5) Exports and certain reexports to Iran are subject to a comprehensive embargo administered by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). If you wish to export or reexport to Iran, the Government of Iran or any entity owned or controlled by that Government, you should review part 746 of the EAR and consult with OFAC. Please note that authorization from OFAC constitutes authorization under the EAR and no separate license or authorization from BIS is required.

(b) Licensing policy. (1) The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of October 23, 1992, requires BIS to deny licenses for items controlled to Iran for national security (section 5 of the 1979 EAA) or foreign policy reasons (section 6 of the 1979 EAA), absent contract sanctity or a Presidential waiver. License applications for which contract sanctity is established may be considered under policies in effect prior to the enactment of that Act. Otherwise, licenses for such items to Iran are subject to a general policy of denial.

(2) License applications for items controlled under section 6(a) of the EAA will also be reviewed to determine whether requirements of section 6(j) apply. Whenever the Secretary of State determines that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of Iran, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance Iran's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to the issuance of a license.

(c) Contract sanctity. Contract sanctity dates and related policies for Iran are listed in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Applicants who wish a pre-existing contract to be considered must submit sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a contract.

(d) U.S. controls. Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining anti-terrorism controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 63 FR 42228, Aug. 7, 1998; 64 FR 27142, May 18, 1999; 65 FR 34075, May 26, 2000; 66 FR 36682, July 12, 2001; 68 FR 16212, Apr. 3, 2003]

§ 742.9 Anti-terrorism: Syria.
top
(a) License requirements. (1) If AT Column 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for export and reexport to Syria for anti-terrorism purposes.

(2) The Secretary of State has designated Syria as a country whose government has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.

(3) In support of U.S. foreign policy against terrorism, BIS maintains two types of anti-terrorism controls on the export and reexport to Syria of items described in Supplement No. 2 to part 742.

(i) Items described in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, if destined to military, police, intelligence or other end-users in Syria, are controlled under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, as amended (EAA).

(ii) Items listed in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742 destined to other end-users in Syria, as well as items to all end-users listed in (c)(6) through (c)(8), (c)(10) through (c)(14), (c)(16) through (c)(19), and (c)(22) through (c)(44) of Supplement No. 2 to part 742, are controlled to Syria under section 6(a) of the EAA.

(b) Licensing policy. (1) Applications for export and reexport to all end-users in Syria of the following items will generally be denied:

(i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that contain CB Column 1, CB Column 2, or CB Column 3 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(ii) Military-related items controlled for national security reasons to any destination. These are items that contain NS Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section in an ECCN on the CCL and is controlled by equipment or material entries ending in the number “18.”

(iii) Items that are controlled for missile proliferation reasons to any destination. These are items that have an MT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(iv) All aircraft (powered and unpowered), helicopters, engines, and related spare parts and components, except that parts and components intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe operation of commercial passenger aircraft will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with a presumption of approval. These are items controlled to any destination for national security and missile technology reasons and items controlled to Syria for anti-terrorism purposes. Such items contain an NS Column 1, NS Column 2, MT Column 1, or AT Column 1 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL. Note that, consistent with the general rule that applies to computing U.S. parts and components content incorporated into foreign made products, all aircraft-related items that require a license to Syria will be included as controlled U.S. content, except for ECCNs 6A998, 7A994, and 9A991.d, for purposes of such licensing requirements.

(v) Cryptographic, cryptoanalytic, and cryptologic items controlled to any destination for national security reasons. Such items contain an AT Column 1 and an NS Column 1 or NS Column 2 in the Country Chart column of the “License Requirements” section of an ECCN on the CCL.

(vi) Explosives detection equipment controlled under ECCN 2A983.

(vii) “Software” (ECCN 2D983) specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983.

(viii) “Technology” (ECCN 2E983) specially designed or modified for the “development”, “production” or “use” of explosives detection equipment controlled by 2A983.

(ix) Commercial charges and devices controlled under ECCN 1C992.

(x) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, controlled under ECCN 1C997.

(xi) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355.

(2) Applications for export and reexport to Syria of all other items described in paragraph (a) of this section, and not described by paragraph (b)(1) of this section, will generally be denied if the export or reexport is destined to a military end-user or for military end-use. Applications for non-military end-users or for non-military end-uses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2), of this section, applications for Syria will be considered on a case-by-case basis if:

(i) The transaction involves the reexport to Syria of items where Syria was not the intended ultimate destination at the time of original export from the United States, provided that the exports from the U.S. occurred prior to the applicable contract sanctity date (or, where the contract sanctity date is December 16, 1986, prior to June 18, 1987).

(ii) The U.S. content of foreign-produced commodities is 20% or less by value; or

(iii) The commodities are medical items.

Note to paragraph (b) of this section: Applicants who wish any of the factors described in paragraph (b) of this section to be considered in reviewing their license applications must submit adequate documentation demonstrating the value of the U.S. content, the specifications and medical use of the equipment, or the date of export from the United States.

(4) License applications for items reviewed under 6(a) controls will also be reviewed to determine the applicability of 6(j) controls to the transaction. When it is determined that an export or reexport could make a significant contribution to the military potential of Syria, including its military logistics capability, or could enhance Syria's ability to support acts of international terrorism, the Secretaries of State and Commerce will notify the Congress 30 days prior to issuance of a license.

(c) Contract sanctity. Contract sanctity dates and related licensing policies for Syria are set forth in Supplement No. 2 to part 742. Applicants who wish a pre-existing contract to be considered must submit sufficient documentation to establish the existence of a contract.

(d) U.S. controls. Although the United States seeks cooperation from like-minded countries in maintaining anti-terrorism controls, at this time these controls are maintained only by the United States.

(e) General Order No. 2, Supplement No. 1 to part 736 of the EAR, sets forth special controls for exports and reexports to Syria. General Order No. 2 supersedes the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section.

[61 FR 12786, Mar. 25, 1996, as amended at 62 FR 25459, May 9, 1997; 63 FR 42228, Aug. 7, 1998; 64 FR 27142, May 18, 1999; 64 FR 47667, Sept. 1, 1999; 64 FR 50248, Sept. 16, 1999; 66 FR 36682, July 12, 2001; 68 FR 16212, Apr. 3, 2003; 71 FR 9442, Feb. 24, 2006]

§ 742.10 Anti-terrorism: Sudan.
top
(a) License requirements. (1) If AT column 1 or AT column 2 1 of the Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for export to Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes.

1 AT column 1 refers to items controlled to Iran, Sudan, and Syria for anti-terrorism purposes. AT column 2 refers to additional items controlled to Iran and Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes. In addition, items included in ECCNs 2A994, 2D994 and 2E994 are controlled to Iran for anti-terrorism purposes.

(2) If AT column 1 or AT column 2 of the Commerce Country Chart (Supplement No. 1 to part 738 of the EAR) is indicated in the appropriate ECCN, a license is required for reexport to Sudan for anti-terrorism purposes, except for ECCNs 2A994; 3A992.a; 5A991.g; 5A992; 6A991; 6A998; 7A994; 8A992.d, .e, .f, and .g; 9A990.a and .b; and 9A991.d and .e. In addition, items in these ECCNs are not countedas controlled U.S. content for the purpose of determining license requirements for U.S. parts, components or materials incorporated into foreign made products. However, the export from the United States to any destination with knowledge that they will be reexported directly or indirectly, in whole or in part to Sudan is prohibited without a license. (continued)